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RECENT DECISIONS

though not by the contribution of "original capital and vital
services."'"
C.

CLARK GRIESINGER

RIGHT TO COUNSEL-STATE PROSECUTIONS -DUE

PROCESS

The petitioner was convicted of larceny in a state court after
a plea of not guilty and was sentenced to a term of two and onehalf to five years in the penitentiary. The petitioner, who was in
his thirties and had been before the courts seventeen times, conducted his own defense and did not question certain errors which
occurred at the trial. The record disclosed no request for counsel
nor offer of counsel by the court. A petition for habeas corpus was
denied by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.' Held: The Fourteenth Amendment2 does not necessarily guarantee everyone charged with serious crime in a state court the right to counsel, but the facts here
show that the petitioner was handicapped by lack of counsel to
such an extent that his constitutional right to a fair trial was
violated. 3
In 1932, in Powell v. Alabama,4 the Supreme Court of the
United States held that in a capital case, when the accused is
unable to employ counsel and is incapable of adequately making
his own defense, the state is required to appoint counsel for him,
whether this is requested or not.' The Court broadly stated that
the right to assistance of counsel was of a fundamental nature,
essential to due process. This view has been followed by subsequent expressions of a similar character by the Court,6 and, in
capital cases, appears to prevail today.' It must be noted, how-

' Gibbs v. Burke, 335 U. S. 867, 69 Sup. Ct. 139 (1948).
CONST. AMEND. XIV, SEc. 2.
Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U. S.773, 69 Sup. Ct. 1247 (1949).

2U. S.
3

4287 U. S. 45, 53 Sup. Ct. 55 (1932).
sNeither failure to request counsel nor a plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of
the right to Counsel. Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786, 65 Sup. Ct. 989 (1945).
6See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S.444, 445, 60 Sup. Ct. 321, 322 (1940); Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U. S.319, 324, 58 Sup. Ct. 149, 151 (1937); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U. S.233, 243-44, 56 Sup. Ct. 444, 446 (1936); cf.
Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U. S.329, 61 Sup. Ct. 572 (1941); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S.278, 56 Sup. Ct. 461 (1936).
7
Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S.471, 65 Sup. Ct. 363 (1945); Tomkins v. Mis-

souri, 323 U. S.485, 65 Sup. Ct. 370 (1945); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329
U. S.663, 67 Sup. Ct. 596 (1947); see Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S.640, 674, 68
Sup. Ct. 763, 780 (1948); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S.437, 441, 69 Sup.
Ct. 184, 185-86 (1948).
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ever, that in no case has the Court actually been required to apply
the "fundamental right" doctrine in a case where it clearly appeared that accused could have adequately carried on his own
defense.
In 1942, in Betts v. Brady,' a non-capital case, the Court
denied that the right to assistance of counsel was fundamental.
It held that an accused, whose request for counsel had been refused and who was unable to employ counsel, had not been
denied due process. The Court said that the Fourteenth Amendment does not obligate the states to furnish counsel in non-capital
cases unless aggravating circumstances make the trial fundamentally unfair.9 Lack of counsel is merely one factor to be considered among othets in determining whether a fair trial was had.
The Betts v. Brady rule has been subjected to vigorous criticism'" and at first appeared to be losing ground. The 1945 case
of Rice v. Olson," deciding that an accused had been denied due
process in a non-capital case, phrased its holding in terms of the
Powell doctrine. 2 The language of White v. Ragen,"3 decided in
the same year, further cut down the force of the Betts rule. 4
However, since 1947, in the cases of Foster v. Illinois,5 Buie
6
Uveges v. Pennsylvania," and in the principal case,
v. Illinois,"
the Supreme Court has approved the Betts doctrine and it ap8 316 U. S. 455, 62 Sup. Ct. 1252 (1942).

9These circumstances include among others: (1) the gravity of the crime;
(2) the age and education of the accused; (3) the conduct of the court and
prosecuting officials; and (4) the legal technicalities involved in the crime
charged and the possible defenses. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437,
69 Sup. Ct. 184 (1948). *
10 Three judges dissented in Betts v.Brady. Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and
Rutledge have dissented consistently in cases affirming the Betts rule or have
concurred in result only where the same result would have been reached under
either the Betts or the Powell rule. See the criticism in the N. Y. Times, Aug. 2,
1942, § 4, p. 6, col. 5, quoted in part by Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent in
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640, 677, n. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 763, 782, n. 1 (1948).
16 So. CALIF. L. REv. 55 (1942); [1948] Wis. L. REv. 235.
" 324 U. S. 786, 65 Sup. Ct. 989 (1945).
12 The distinction between capital and non-capital cases was ignored and Betts
v. Brady was not cited.
13 324 U. S. 760, 65 Sup. Ct. 978 (1945).
14 "We have many times repeated that not only does due process require that
a defendant on trial in a state court upon a serious criminal charge and unable
to defend himself shall have benefit of counsel. . ." (Italics supplied). Id. at
763-64, 65 Sup. Ct. at 980.
Is 332 U. S. 134, 67 Sup. Ct. 1716 (1947), 26 T.x. L. Rv. 665 (1948).
16 333 U. S. 640, 68 Sup. Ct. 763 (1948), 9 011o ST. L. J. 529.
17 335 U. S. 437, 69 Sup. Ct. 184 (1948), 24 WAsH. L. R.v. 161 (1949).

